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Article IX: The Promise and Limits of Home Rule
Richard Briffault*
A fundamental purpose of a constitution is to establish the structure of government. A
constitution creates the component parts of the government, allocates powers and responsibilities
among them, and sets out rules for how the parts are to interact in the course of governing.
American governments typically have both vertical and horizontal dimensions, that is, they
consist of different tiers of government with different territorial jurisdiction and functional
authority, and also separate powers among different institutions within a given level of
government. The United States Constitution, for example, divides power vertically by
establishing a federal structure consisting of the United States government and the states, and
then allocates power within the federal government horizontally among three different branches.
The New York State Constitution, similarly, provides for both a state government, with a
horizontal separation of powers among the legislature, executive and judiciary, and a vertical
division between the state and local governments.
The federal-state and state-local relationships, however, are quite different. The federal
Constitution does not create the states, give the states powers or authority, or treat the states as
subordinate branches of the national government. Indeed, it says little about the states and leaves
their internal organization and powers to the states themselves. The federal Constitution is
focused on creating the federal government and simply assumes there are and will continue to be
states with broad law-making powers. It does shift some governmental functions from the states
to the federal government; imposes some constraints on the states; provides a role for the states
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in the organization of the federal government; and addresses federal-state conflicts. But state
autonomy is a given, not a product of the Constitution.
The state-local relationship is something else altogether. Legally, local governments are
creatures of the state. They are established by the state, and wield only those powers delegated to
them by the legislature. The state can require them to take on certain responsibilities or bar them
from other activities. Of course, active, locally-elected local governments have long been
considered crucial for democratic self-government, particularly in a large and diverse state like
New York. Local governments provide many of the public goods and services and adopt and
enforce many of the regulations that most affect people in their homes and neighborhoods.
Public safety, sanitation, street and road maintenance, and land use regulation have long been
traditional local functions, as people typically want to keep these matters “close to home.” In
fact, New York has had a tradition of active local governments going back to the colonial era.
But legally local powers derive from the state – that is, laws enacted by the state legislature -and can be taken back by the state. And there has also been a long tradition of the state keeping
local governments on a relatively short leash and interfering with local decision-making.
Against this backdrop, the role of the state constitution for local governments and statelocal relations is to protect and promote local self-government by providing local units with a
greater measure of independent governing authority, not dependent on the whims of the
legislature, and by giving them some protection from state interference. Initially, the New York
constitutional provisions dealing with local government focused on assuring local popular
control. Following the pre-Revolutionary practice, the Constitution of 1777 provided that town
officers previously elected by the people should continue to be filled by popular election.1 The
Constitution of 1821 extended the filling of local offices by local election to counties, cities, and
2
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villages.2 The Constitution of 1846 confirmed the norm of local selection – either by popular
election or by appointment by other locally elected officials – of local government officers
whose selection was not otherwise provided for in the Constitution.3 But these early constitutions
did little to guarantee that local governments, even though elected by local residents, would
actually have any real governing authority. Instead for nearly a century, from the post-Civil War
period to the 1960s, New York’s constitution-writers struggled over how to establish local
autonomy and entrench it from state interference – what is known as “home rule.” Each
constitutional revision incrementally improved the status of local governments, culminating in
the ratification in November 1963 of Article IX, which established a “bill of rights for local
governments,” but also confirmed a continuing role for the legislature concerning local matters.4
Article IX, unamended since its adoption, establishes the basic constitutional framework
for addressing questions of local power, local government organization, and state-local and
interlocal relations. It is premised on a commitment to “[e]ffective local self-government.”5 Has
it given New York’s local units – its counties, cities, towns and villages -- the powers and
resources they need to function as efficient, effective, locally accountable governments? Not
really. Article IX has bolstered local control over local government organization and personnel
and has provided a firmer foundation for local law-making. Yet, as New York’s highest court
recently put it, more than fifty years after Article IX’s ratification, the fundamental principle that
“the authority of political subdivisions flows from the state and is, in a sense, an exception to the
state government’s otherwise plenary power” still controls and “the lawmaking power of a
county or other political subdivision ‘can be exercised only to the extent it has been delegated by
the State.’”6 Article IX has done little to protect local governments from state interference, and
has done nothing to provide local governments with financial autonomy. It has also left in place
3

an extremely complex and fragmented local government structure, with multiple levels of
overlapping governments, without any assurance that these local governments have the
jurisdiction or resources needed to address the needs of their residents.
This Chapter will initially examine how Article IX both promotes and constrains local
self-government. Some limits on local autonomy are written into the text of the constitution
while others grow out of judicial decisions that have tended to bolster state power over local
matters. It will also analyze the constitution’s treatment of the financial position of local
governments and questions of interlocal relations. It will conclude by considering measures by
which the gap between the constitution’s promise of local autonomy and the reality of limited
local power can be addressed.
Home Rule
Home rule has two strands: (i) initiative, that is, the ability of local governments to make
decisions concerning such local matters as local government organization, the delivery of local
services, and the adoption of regulations dealing with local issues without having to seek specific
permission from the state; and (ii) immunity, that is, the ability of local governments to protect
such local decisions from state displacement. Traditional legal concepts provided for neither
local initiative nor local immunity. Instead, the governing legal principle known as Dillon’s Rule
held that local governments enjoyed only those powers expressly granted by the state,
necessarily implied in the express grant, or essential to carrying out the delegated powers. Doubt
about a local power was to be resolved against its existence. And any power once granted could
subsequently be modified, reduced or eliminated by the state.
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The home rule movement emerged in the late nineteenth century to counteract Dillon’s
Rule and provide a firm constitutional foundation for local self-government. In New York, the
Constitution of 1894 took the first step towards some form of constitutional home rule, followed
by additional home rule amendments in 1923 and 1938. The earliest provisions were focused on
a version of immunity by seeking to make it more difficult for the legislature to engage in
targeted meddling into local affairs in individual localities, particularly New York City and other
cities; over time, though, the constitution began to provide a foundation for local initiative as
well. The 1963 amendment revamped and expanded these early measures into Article IX.
Article IX.
Section 1 of Article IX declares “[e]ffective local self-government” is one of the
“purposes of the people of the state,” and provides that every local government – defined broadly
to include counties (other than those making up New York City), cities, towns, and villages –
“shall have a legislative body elective by the people thereof.” (Art. IX, sec. 1(a)) As already
indicated, the commitment to locally elected local governments grows out of a much older
constitutional tradition.
Section 2 then establishes a constitutional foundation for the “rights, powers, privileges
and immunities,” again including counties, cities, towns, and villages. Section 2 provides that (i)
“every local government shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with
the provisions of this constitution or any general law relating to its property, affairs or
government” and that (ii) “every local government shall have power to adopt and amend local
laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law” concerning ten
specified subjects “whether or not they relate to the property, affairs or government of such local
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government,” although the legislature may restrict the adoption of local laws relating to these ten
areas to the “property, affairs or government of such local government.” (Art. IX, sec. 2(c)). The
ten enumerated areas of local law-making would likely fit under the general category of local
“property, affairs or government” even if not specifically addressed, as they include such basic
local government issues as the powers, duties, qualifications, terms of office, compensation, etc.
of local government officers and employees; the membership and composition of the local
legislative body; the transaction of local government business; the acquisition, care and
management of local roads, streets, highways, and property; dealings with government
contractors; and an omnibus provision that would probably cover all the others concerning the
“government, protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property
therein.” (Art. IX, sec. 2(c)(10)). The last provision is, in effect, a brief statement of what is
generally known as “the police power.” A different section of Article IX enables local
governments to exercise the power of eminent domain by taking private land within their borders
for public use. (Art. IX, sec. 1(e)).
Section 2 also provides that the legislature shall enact, and may amend, a Statute of Local
Governments granting to local governments powers including but not limited to those of local
legislation and administration in addition to the powers vested in them by the rest of Article IX.
(Art. IX, sec. 2(b)(1)). The legislature may diminish or suspend any power granted by this
statute only by a law passed by and approved by the governor in each of two successive calendar
years. Finally, section 3(c) of the article declares that the “[r]ights, powers, privileges and
immunities granted to local governments by this article shall be liberally construed.” (Art. IX,
sec. 3(c).
Local Initiative.
6

Taken together, the rhetorical commitment to local self-government, the endorsement of
local power to enact local laws concerning local “property, affairs or government” and the
health, safety and well-being of local people, and the rule of liberal construction go far toward
establishing the local initiative component of home rule. Local governments have authority to
pass laws addressing local problems and concerns without having to first obtain Albany’s
consent. Although the scope of the phrase “property, affairs or government” may be open to
debate, the ten enumerated grants specifically confirm local power to act with respect to most
matters that are likely to be of local concern. Indeed, there has been relatively little litigation
concerning local power to act concerning local matters in the first instance.
State Preemption.
The real problem for local governments is that frequently their powers are hemmed in,
and thus preempted, by state laws. Hard-wired into section 2 is a fundamental constraint on local
action: A local law must not be “inconsistent” with the constitution of the state or with any
“general law,” that is, any state law that applies statewide to all local units within any category of
local government (e.g., all cities, all counties, all towns, or all villages). In other words, in cases
of conflict between local laws and general state laws, the state law prevails and preempts the
inconsistent local law. As the court of appeals has observed, “the preemption doctrine represents
a fundamental limitation on home rule powers.”7 Given the pervasiveness of state legislation,
this can seriously constrain local action. For example, the state’s Vehicle and Traffic Law denies
local governments the power to require a motor vehicle owner to obtain a permit to use any
public highway. As a result, no New York locality may adopt residential parking permit
programs as a means of addressing traffic congestion without obtaining specific authorization
from the state legislature.8
7

Moreover, the concept of “inconsistency” goes well beyond state laws that expressly
prohibit certain types of local action. A local law may be found to be deemed “inconsistent”
with state law if it adds a requirement to the state’s requirements, raises the standard above that
set by the state, or provides for a local variation from the state’s procedure. Thus, for example,
when the New York City Council sought to prohibit city agencies from contracting with firms
that failed to provide their employees’ domestic partners with employment benefits equal to
those provided to spouses – and the regulation of contractors is one of the ten enumerated areas
of local authority listed in Article IX, Section 2 – the New York Court of Appeals held the local
measure preempted by the state’s competitive bidding law for municipalities. The state law did
not bar local measures to require municipal contractors to provide benefits to domestic partners.
But the court determined that the state’s directive “that municipalities contract with the lowest
responsible bidder is plainly in tension with the right of a municipality to say that it will contract
only with firms that provide certain benefits”9 as the lowest responsible bidder might not provide
those benefits. Similarly, the court of appeals has held that the provision of the state’s Village
Law setting the standard for determining when a landowner is entitled to a variance from a local
zoning ordinance preempted the efforts of two villages to set a different standard even though the
court acknowledged the villages’ zoning variance standards had no extra-local effect and the
decision limited “the right of localities to govern in matters of purely local concern.”10
Field Preemption.
The courts have further constrained local autonomy by determining that if the state
extensively regulates a subject the state has “occupied the field,” thereby preempting any
additional local regulation in the “field,” including local rules that do not actually conflict with
any provision of the state law. Such “field preemption” need not be expressly stated by the
8

legislature but may be inferred from the scope and details of the state legislative scheme. Thus,
when the town of Guilderland sought to fund improvements to its roads through a transportation
impact fee, the court found that the state’s “comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme in the
field of highway funding” occupied the field and preempted the town’s impact fee even though
nothing in the state scheme barred such fees.11
Determining whether state regulation is sufficiently comprehensive as to “occupy” a field
and determining what exactly are the contours of a “field” will inevitably be the subject of
dispute. To be sure, the courts at times have been respectful of local decision-making. In the
hotly contested question of whether towns may use their power over zoning to prohibit oil and
gas production activities, thereby blocking any hydrofracking within their borders, the court of
appeals concluded that although the state had occupied the field of the regulation of oil and gas
production, the local zoning power to determine what is a permissible land use constitutes a
different field, not preempted by the state oil and gas production law.12 The court affirmed
“[t]here is no dispute” that the state law barred local regulation of how fracking is conducted and
that the legislature could go further and eliminate local power to use zoning to exclude fracking.
But the oil and gas regulation law did not preempt local action to bar fracking. Similarly, New
York City’s “adult establishment” zoning ordinance, which required that bars featuring topless
dancing be confined to certain manufacturing and high-density commercial districts, was not
preempted by the state’s comprehensive regulation of establishments licensed to sell alcoholic
beverages under the Alcohol Beverage Control Law.13
Local governments have been given a bit more freedom to refashion some aspects of their
internal organization. For example, the courts have upheld the power of a county to authorize the
setting of real property tax equalization rates by action of the county executive, not, as state law
9

provides by the board of assessors,14 and to depart from the process prescribed by state law for
the filling of vacancies in county offices.15 In the county office vacancy case, the court of appeals
emphasized the significance of the “philosophy and the explicit formulations” of the
constitutional provisions dealing with local control over local offices as well as the lack of clear
evidence of legislative intent to deny to counties “[a]n aspect of government organization as
limited as the method of filling [local] legislative vacancies.”16
The point is not so much that judicial preemption doctrines necessarily result in the
imposition of restrictions on local home rule authority as that these doctrines always cast a
shadow over local power and provide a legal theory for challenging local decisions.
Doctrine of State Concern.
Arguably an even more significant factor limiting local autonomy has been the judicial
willingness to sustain state laws that target individual local governments for state displacement.
Article IX clearly permits the state to completely take over certain fields to the exclusion of local
action. But building on an older constitutional tradition, Article IX also seeks to bar state
legislation aimed at an individual locality or a small number of localities. To that end, Article IX
distinguishes between “general” and “special” laws. A general law is one that applies to all
counties, all cities, all towns, or all villages; a local law is presumptively preempted if it is
inconsistent with a general law. A law which applies to less than the full class of counties, cities,
towns or villages is a “special” law; in order for a special law to displace a local measure, Article
IX requires that the law must have been enacted: (a) on the request of either two-thirds of the
local legislature or the combination of the local chief executive officer and a majority of the local
legislature – this is known as a “home rule message”, or (b) on a certificate of necessity from the
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governor and with the approval of two-thirds of both houses of the legislature; however the
certificate of necessity procedure does not apply for special laws concerning New York City.
(Art. IX, sec. 2(b)(2)). The idea here is that when a local government requests special treatment,
such as the grant of special authority to deal with a particular local problem, it is all right for the
legislature to adopt a targeted special law. So, too, for local governments other than New York
City the combination of a special gubernatorial request and legislative supermajorities provide a
constitutional foundation for a targeted special law.
However, due to the “state concern” doctrine, the legislature’s ability to adopt measures
aimed at specific local governments is much broader than the text of the Constitution suggests.
As the court of appeals has determined, state and local interests are not mutually exclusive and,
in the words of then-Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo, the state may adopt a special law affecting
local property, affairs, or government – without a home rule message, gubernatorial request, or
legislative supermajority – “if the subject be in a substantial degree a matter of State concern . . .
though intermingled with it are concerns of the locality.”17 The state concern doctrine was
adopted decades before the ratification of Article IX, but the court of appeals has continued to
apply it, thereby confirming the scope of state power over local matters. Indeed, in 2013, the
court emphatically asserted “there must be an area of overlap, indeed a very sizeable one, in
which the state legislature acting by special law and local governments have concurrent powers. .
. . A great deal of legislation relates both to ‘the property, affairs or government of a local
government’ and to ‘[m]atters other than the property, affairs or government of a local
government’ – i.e., to matters of substantial state concern.”18
Over the last several decades, the court has invoked the state concern doctrine to uphold
special state laws dealing with such diverse local matters as residency requirements and dispute11

resolution mechanisms for local public employees,19 bidding on public contracts,20 the disposal
of solid waste by landfills in two Long Island counties,21 local taxation of commuter incomes,22
and aid to local cultural institutions.23 The court has held that the doctrine of state concern
applies to powers granted specifically by the Statute of Local Governments as well as those
deriving from the more general grants of authority in Article IX.24 On one unusual occasion the
court of appeals found that a targeted state law did not advance a substantial state interest. The
state law created an exception, applicable only to negotiations between New York City and its
police, from the statewide rule that local governments could opt out of the state’s impasseresolution mechanism and use an impasse arbitration panel appointed by a local collective
bargaining board. In a later opinion explaining the decision, the court stated that the relationship
between the law and the asserted state goals of creating state-wide uniformity with respect to
impasse procedures and a fairer forum for New York City police was “pretextual” and not
advanced by the legislation so that the law constituted “the sort of state meddling in purely local
affairs that the Home Rule section was enacted to prohibit.”25 Subsequently, however, the court
upheld a less narrowly targeted state law that had the same substantive effect of transferring the
resolution of bargaining impasses from local governments to a state agency.26
A recent decision illustrates the power of the state concern doctrine. In Greater New York
Taxi Ass’n v. State of New York,27 the court unanimously upheld a state law – adopted without
the benefit of a home rule message -- regulating medallion cabs and livery vehicles in New York
City only. The court concluded that despite the long tradition of the City’s control over its taxi
service, taxis within the five boroughs are “not a purely local issue” but instead a “matter of
substantial state concern.”28 The state concern was based on the fact that “[m]illions of people
from within and without the State visit the City annually” and that “[e]fficient transportation
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service in the State’s largest city and international center of commerce is important to the entire
State.”29 By that measure of “substantial state interest” there appears to be little constraint on the
state legislature’s ability to address New York City issues by special law without a home rule
message. With the court having observed in another recent decision that the “Home Rule
provisions . . . were never intended to apply to legislation [affecting matters of state concern]”
and instead aimed only at preventing “unjustifiable state interference in matters of purely local
concern,”30 it is evident that Article IX provides not much protection to local governments.
Classification.
In addition to the state concern doctrine, the court of appeals has upheld the authority of
the state to adopted targeted local laws under the doctrine of classification. Under classification,
a law is a general law even if it is limited to a subset – or class – of localities provided “entry
into” the class is “governed by conformity or compliance with specified conditions,”31 typically
based on population size provided that population is “reasonably related to the subject of the
statute.”32 The court has frequently upheld state laws addressed to cities of one million or more
people even though there has only been one city in New York state’s history that ever had that
population on the theory that the “class” is technically open and because “conditions in a city of
such size, inevitably the center of a megalopolis, are demonstrably different from conditions in
smaller cities.”33 Although New York City and other big cities have been the primary focus of
the classification defense, classifications based on small population size have also been
sustained.34 However, the court has also invalidated very narrow population classifications where
population had little relation to the subject.35
Local Fiscal Autonomy
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An essential precondition for the “[e]ffective local self-government” promised by Article
IX is fiscal autonomy. Local governments must have access to the funds they need to pay for the
programs local residents want. Although local resources are inevitably constrained by the taxable
wealth available within local borders, fiscal autonomy would enable localities to tap local
resources by adopting local taxes consistent with the preferences of local residents. However,
localities in New York enjoy little fiscal independence. Article IX grants no powers of local
taxation. The ten enumerated grants in section 2 include the power to adopt local laws dealing
with the “levy, collection and administration” of local taxation and assessments for local
improvements, but only to the extent authorized by the legislature and consistent with laws (not
limited to general laws) passed by the legislature. A separate provision of the constitution,
Article XVI, Section 1, declares that the “power of taxation shall never be surrendered,
suspended or contracted away” by the state, in effect confirming that home rule does not include
any taxing authority. That section further provides that any state laws that delegate the taxing
power “shall specify the types of taxes which may be imposed” and “provide for their review.”
This prohibits general enabling acts that could otherwise authorize local governments to adopt
local taxes at their own discretion. Another article of the Constitution, Article VIII, imposes caps
on local real property tax levies and on local indebtedness.36 The debt limits are percentages of
the value of local taxable real estate – even if the locality derives a significant fraction of its
revenue from other sources, such as sales or income taxes. The tax limits are also calculated as a
percentage of the value of taxable real estate within the locality, with the limits ranging from
1.5% for counties to 2.0% for villages and most cities, and 2.5% for New York City.37
The lack of any local taxing power is a real constraint on local autonomy. If a local
government seeks an additional source of revenue, or wants to raise the rate of any tax (other
14

than the property tax) which the legislature previously authorized it to levy, it must go to Albany
for the necessary authority. The existence and magnitude of county and municipal sales or
income taxes, thus, turn entirely on the decisions of the state legislature. New York City required
state approval before it could impose an income tax, and it was legally powerless when the
legislature repealed its authorization to tax commuter incomes.38 Even a relatively minor
question, such as whether real property tax refunds are to be paid by a county or by the
individual taxing school districts within the county, is up to the state. As the court of appeals
recently observed in striking down a Nassau County measure that sought to change the refund
obligation, “only a clearly expressed, rather than implied, grant of relevant legislative power
could have authorized” the county to pass the challenged local law.39 “The constitutional power
of taxation extends not just to the collection of taxes or the setting of tax rates, but also to the
administration of the tax system and the direct allocation of tax burdens and benefits.”40
Local tax expenditures – that is, credits or deductions designed to encourage certain
behaviors by taxpayers – are also typically governed by state law. A study found that all but one
of the tax expenditures listed by New York City in a recent annual report on tax expenditures had
to be authorized by the state legislature.41 These matters are entirely outside the scope of local
home rule so that they cannot be addressed by a local law “unless the State has expressly
delegated to the [locality] the power to pass such a local tax law.”42
Beyond denying a local role in adopting new taxes, revising pre-existing ones, or
implementing changes to the administration of the tax system, the lack of fiscal home rule also
constrains local regulatory authority and, thus, the local ability to promote local health, safety
and well-being. Taxation can be an important policy tool for discouraging undesirable behavior
in a manner potentially more nuanced and less intrusive on personal autonomy than direct
15

command and control regulation.43 For example, it has been suggested that Mayor Bloomberg
advanced New York City’s sugary drink portion limit44 to reduce the consumption of sugary
drinks because a tax on such drinks would have required state legislative authorization.
Similarly, one observer contends although bag fees “have proven successful in promoting the
reuse of bags in several cities, . . . New York City abandoned efforts to impose such a tax
because of the state approval requirement.”45

And the City was unable to implement a

congestion pricing program to alleviate the ills associated by an excess concentration of
automobiles in Manhattan partly because the program involved taxation that required, but could
not obtain, Albany’s approval.46
Local Restructuring
Article IX also addresses local government cooperation and structural changes. Section 1
provides that local governments shall have the power to agree “as authorized by the legislature”
with the federal government, the state or one or more local governments in the state to jointly or
cooperatively provide any facility, service or activity which each participating local government
has the power to provide on its own. (Art. IX, sec. 1(c)). Another subdivision of section 1 bars
any local government from annexing new territory without the consent by referendum of the
people in the area proposed to be annexed and the approval of the governing board of each local
government whose area is affected by the proposed annexation. (Art. IX, sec. 1(d).48 The section
also provides for changes in the form of county government and the transfer of functions among
local governments within a county: Counties “shall be empowered by general law, or by special
law enacted upon county request” to adopt, amend or repeal alternative forms of county
government provided by the legislature, which can include the transfer of duties among
governments within a county or the abolition of certain offices or units of local government.
16

(Art. IX, sec. 1(h)(1)). However, no change in the form of county government can become
effective unless approved in a referendum by both a majority of the votes cast outside of the
cities in the county and a majority of the aggregated votes cast in all cities in the county; and if
the alternative form of government involves the transfer of function from a village or the
abolition of a village office, a third majority of votes cast in all the affected villages, taken
together, is also required. (Art. IX, sec. 1(h)(1).
Article IX was inserted when the role of counties was in transition. Traditionally,
counties were subdivisions of the state that existed primarily to perform state functions – like
record-keeping, law enforcement, property assessment, road maintenance – locally. Increasing
urbanization and suburbanization and the growth of metropolitan areas led to calls for stronger
counties that could function as municipal governments for unincorporated areas and as “regional
governments” coordinating the activities of the municipalities within their borders.50 However,
counties traditionally lacked an independent executive or chief administrator, and the county
legislatures were usually boards of supervisors consisting of the town or city supervisors within
the county, rather than representatives elected for the purpose of serving on a county law-making
body. The legislature, initially by special act and then via an alternative county government law,
moved to provide counties with the opportunity to create stronger government structures. Article
IX’s transfer of function and county restructuring provisions build on that. Although Article IX
essentially confirms what the legislature had previously been doing, in the decade after its
adoption ten counties moved to strengthen their governments, with nearly all providing for a
county executive with budgetary power and the authority to appoint and remove department
heads.51 The courts have also relied on the transfer of function provision to sustain county
organizational changes, such as shortening the term of a sheriff by merging the position into
17

another office,52 or adopting a mechanism for filling vacancies in the office of county legislator
that differs from that provided by state law.53
A key theme in the cooperation, boundary change, and restructuring provisions is local
control. No change or agreement can be forced on a local government through these provisions
without local consent -- often the consent of local voters in a referendum, with the separate
consents of different local voters from different communities or types of communities required
for annexation and county restructuring and transfer of functions. Although the thrust of the
constitutional text appears to be to authorize and facilitate change, the multiple consents required
may have the effect of making such changes difficult to achieve.
Moving Forward
Effective local self-government requires that local people be able to control their
governments and that local governments have the authority to make policy with respect to
important local concerns. Such authority entails (i) the ability to act in the first instance, (ii) the
power to protect local decisions concerning local matters from state displacement, and (iii)
adequate resources to implement the programs that local people want. Article IX does a
reasonable job in providing the first power, fails on the second, and does not even address the
third. To be sure, these are difficult matters to address in a constitution. Local immunity from
state displacement is not necessarily a good thing. Local decisions can have effects beyond local
borders, and multiple and divergent local laws on many subjects can make it difficult for people
to know the law and can burden the free movement of people and goods within the state. Most
metropolitan areas are fragmented into large numbers of relatively small local governments, and
most places are typically within the jurisdiction of at least two general purpose local
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governments with home rule power – a county and either a city, a town, or a village. There is
surely some role for the state in standardizing and coordinating local government activities,
controlling their external effects, and preventing conflicts. Many environmental, infrastructure
and economic issues implicate regional concerns that will span multiple localities. Many local
governments are very small – 415 towns (that is 45% of all towns) have populations of less than
2,500; and 344 villages (62% of all villages) have fewer than 2,500 people. Even many cities are
relatively small: 32 of the state’s 62 cities have fewer than 20,000 people.54 Many would lack
adequate resources to handle their problems even if they had broader revenue-raising power.
Local government might work better with fewer, bigger localities, with controls that prevent
localities from impinging on each other. In other words, the constitutional goal of “effective local
self-government” requires both local autonomy and state involvement in assuring adequate local
resources and addressing the overall structure of the local government system.
Limiting State Preemption.
There is no ready solution to the problem of state interference with local government
actions. Strong local immunity from the state would require a sharp demarcation between local
matters and state matters. Such a line is inherently difficult to draw and would certainly change
over time. The state needs to be able to address local spillovers and problems that are bigger than
a single locality even if less than statewide. Moreover, some state-local disputes are really
interlocal conflicts or even intralocal conflicts refought at the state level. Both the issues of
whether the state competitive bidding law barred New York City from requiring its contractors to
provide benefits to their employees’ domestic partners and whether the state could regulate the
New York City taxi industry were really internal local conflicts, with one branch of the city
government (in both cases the mayor) turning to the state to outflank the city council.
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Still, sometimes state legislative action interferes with local decisions without really
advancing a state goal, and sometime local actions technically inconsistent with state law are not
really at odds with state policy. The legislature might enact general legislation binding all local
governments, but be willing to accept some local laws that vary somewhat from state law.
Indeed, some state laws expressly authorize some local “supersession,” that is, a departure within
a specified range from the state rule. Towns, for example, may depart from the Town Law with
respect to some aspects of the process of subdivision approval,55 and villages may supersede the
Village Law with respect to the appointment and termination of village personnel.56
One way to promote local autonomy while still protecting the ultimate power to enact a
general law displacing local action would be to limit preemption to (i) situations of outright
conflict where it would be impossible for a person to comply with both state law and local law at
the same time and (ii) instances of explicit state prohibition of the local action. This would in
effect reverse the presumption and generally permit local supersession with respect to local
matters unless clearly precluded by the legislature.
This change in preemption doctrine could be accomplished by constitutional amendment.
Illinois’s home rule article, for example, provides: “Home rule units may exercise and perform
concurrently with the State any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the
General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically
declare the State’s exercise to be exclusive.”57 This would preserve state supremacy while also
expanding local autonomy. The court of appeals could also change its thinking about
preemption, although there is little evidence that the court is inclined to do so. Still, if the court
were to become more sympathetic to the claims of local autonomy, it could be argued that
Article IX’s provision for the “liberal” construction of local rights, powers, privileges and
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immunities (Art. IX, sec. 3(c)) supports a judicial presumption against preemption.58
Alternatively, the legislature could adopt such a rule to guide the courts, although, again, there is
little reason to believe the legislature will do so.
The other preemption matter that needs to be addressed is the use of the state concern
doctrine to sustain the preemptive effect of special laws enacted without regard to the
constitution’s procedural requirements for special laws – a home rule message or, for any
municipality other than New York City, a gubernatorial request followed by supermajority
legislative votes. The special law requirements are intended to address the most troubling form
of state intrusion into local autonomy – laws meddling with specifically targeted localities. The
state concern doctrine was first articulated by the court of appeals nearly four decades before
Article IX was adopted but the court continues to apply the doctrine as if Article IX and its
commitment to effective local self-government did not exist. To be sure, the state concern
doctrine accurately captures the idea that there are areas of both state and local concern. But
where the state action singles out specific localities without local consent the prospect of
unwarranted state interference is enhanced. In any event, the state concern doctrine comes close
to nullifying the carefully wrought constitutional provisions dealing with special laws.
To be sure, the state needs to be able to adopt laws that focus on some limited groups of
local government, such as big cities or those in a distinct region, like Long Island, the Hudson
Valley, or near the Finger Lakes, that share environmental, infrastructure, or economic problems.
The classification doctrine has provided the state with some – maybe too much -- flexibility in
defining general law in light of the distinct circumstances of different types of local
governments. Building on, and refining that experience, “special law” could be redefined and
narrowed to mean a law applicable to just one or perhaps a very small number of localities. State
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adoption of special laws would then be limited to the home rule message requirement – or
message of necessity plus supermajority vote for localities other than New York City -- and the
doctrine of state concern could be scrapped. This would be consistent with the long-established
constitutional goal of preventing state meddling with targeted localities while also allowing the
state to address groups of local governments with common problems. As with the proposed
presumption against preemption, this could be done by constitutional amendment or by the
efforts of local governments as litigants or amici in court of appeals cases to persuade the court
to be more respectful of the state-local balance already embodied in Article IX’s limits on state
power to act by local law.
Fiscal Autonomy.
There are several ways to promote local fiscal autonomy. First, local governments could
be given the power to tax by amending the constitution to provide that home rule includes the
power to impose taxes on people and activities within the jurisdiction. Given the overlapping
jurisdictions of many localities, with multiple local governments able to make colorable claims
of authority over the same taxable event, there would have to be some mechanism, either in the
constitution or ordinary legislation, to allocate taxing authority among them. Alternatively, home
rule taxing power could be vested in higher-level local governments – counties (with the City of
New York treated as a single “county”) – subject to some constitutional or statutory requirement
for allocating revenues among localities within the county. This would leave the question of
local taxation primarily up to local decision-making rather than the state.
Second, local governments could be better protected from costs imposed on them by the
state – what are known as “unfunded mandates.” Unfunded mandates can be a major
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infringement on local fiscal autonomy as they commandeer local governments to serve the
state’s ends by diverting local resources to state-determined priorities and programs. Unfunded
mandates impair government accountability in general as the legislature is free to impose costs
on local taxpayers without paying any political penalty while local officials may be held
accountable by the voters for costs over which they have no control. A number of state
constitutions address unfunded mandates. The California Constitution, for example, provides that
whenever the legislature or a state agency “mandates a new program or higher level of service on
any local government, the State shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse that local
government for the costs of the program or increased level of service.”59 Mandates requested by
the local government or dealing with crime or certain other subjects are excepted. To be sure, not
all mandates are necessarily inappropriate. For example, some local actions may impose burdens,
such as pollution, on other communities; requiring a locality to ameliorate these costs could be
treated as a mandate. Some state constitutions address mandates not by barring them but by
requiring their legislatures to attach fiscal notes to bills proposing mandates that provide notice
of the local government costs the mandates would impose. A fiscal note requirement – which
could also be adopted by ordinary legislation – would not limit the State’s ability to impose new
mandates,60 but by increasing awareness of a mandate and its costs such a rule could produce a
more vigorous debate over measures proposing mandates.
Third, even with additional taxing authority and mandates relief many local governments
may be unable to provide the local services and programs their residents want. This may be due
to the limited local tax base, high levels of poverty and need, or the small size of the locality. In
these situations, enhancing local ability to engage in the effective self-government the
constitution promises may require affirmative state assistance. One form state aid could take is
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financial. The state could provide grants to those localities where local resources are inadequate,
or where tapping into local resources would require high levels of local taxation. The state could
be required to determine a basic level of local public services for all communities, the cost of
providing that basic level, and whether each locality has the tax base to provide those services at
a reasonable tax rate. For those localities that cannot raise local revenues sufficient to pay for the
program at the state-determined maximum reasonable local tax rate, the state could be required
to make up the difference with state aid. This proposal builds on a concept developed in many
state school finance reforms of requiring states to meet their obligation to provide all school
children with a constitutionally required level of education by providing a guaranteed tax base to
all school districts (with state aid going to districts that lack sufficient local taxable resources) to
do the job. Such a state basic local services guarantee could be added to the constitution or,
given the need for some flexibility in determining what constitutes the basic local service
package or reasonable local tax rate, by legislation.
Local Government Restructuring.
Alternatively, the state could act to improve local fiscal capacity by reducing the number
of small, overlapping, resource-poor localities. The state currently has nearly 1,600 general
purpose (that is county, city, town or village) local governments. Many are quite small, and most
have boundaries that date back to the nineteenth century. These better reflect nineteenth century
settlement patterns and economic interactions than today’s sprawling, commuter-based
metropolitan areas. As a result, not only are many localities too small to have adequate resources,
but they may cover only a fraction of a socio-economic area. Moreover, not uncommonly, more
than two local governments have overlapping jurisdiction over the same territory, producing
inefficiencies, unnecessarily large government sectors, and uncertainties about the location of
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governmental responsibility. If someone sat down to design a local government system today, it
is very unlikely the result would look like our current system. The constitution does little to
facilitate modernizing the local government structure. It authorizes annexation and the transfer of
functions within counties, but subject to referendum requirements that make these reorganization
actions difficult.
The state could improve local government performance and make local self-government
more effective by taking an active role in reviewing and, ultimately, reordering the configuration
of local governments. There ought to be a state-level institution responsible for examining local
boundaries, the powers delegated to or exercised by categories of governments, or the local
government structure within particular regions and proposing changes to the current local
government system that could include abolition or merger of particular governments that are too
small or that unnecessarily fragment the governance of a region.
The details of such a Local Government Review Commission are well beyond the scope
of this essay. Probably it ought to be able only to recommend changes, with final action up to the
legislature. Affected local residents and governments ought to be able to participate in its
deliberations. It ought to be given standards to apply, recognizing that those standards are likely
to be relatively general and will take on meaning only as applied in particular local or regional
settings. The key point is that there ought to be some state-level mechanism that provides for a
comprehensive, periodic examination of the structure of the local government system and local
governance in different areas of the state in light of both the constitutional goal of “effective
local self-government” and the ever-changing social, economic and technological “facts on the
ground.” Such a Local Government Review Commission could be created either by the
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legislature or by the constitution, although constitutional authorization would be valuable in
confirming that measures to “right-size” local governments are consistent with home rule.
The constitutional goal of effective local self-government turns on more than the formal
legal rights and powers of local governments. To succeed, local governments must be provided
with the resources they need to meet their responsibilities. So, too, their size, their relationship to
adjacent and overlapping localities and their jurisdiction and boundaries must realistically relate
to the size and economic and social organization of the neighborhoods and communities they are
intended to govern.

*

Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.

1. N.Y. Const. of 1777, § 29.
2. N.Y. Const. of 1821, art. IV, § 15.
3. N.Y. Const. of 1846, art. X, §§ 1, 2.
4. Other provisions affecting local governments are scattered throughout the constitution,
including Article III, section 5 (setting population minimum for the creation of new counties);
Article III, section 17 (restriction of the legislature’s power to pass private or local bills); Article
VIII (local finance); Article X , section 1 (exempting municipal corporations from the general
ban on the creation of corporations by special act); Article XIII (various provisions dealing with
public officers, including local government officers); Article XVI (taxation); and Article XVIII
(housing).
5. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 1.
6. Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist. v. County of Nassau, 22 N.Y.3d 606, 619 (2014).
7. Albany Area Builders Ass’n v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 377 (1989).

26

8. See Erin Adele Scharff, “Taxes as Regulatory Tools: An Argument for Expanding New York
City’s Taxing Authority,” New York University Law Review 86, no. 5 (November 2011): 157374.
9. Council of City of New York v. Bloomberg, 6 N.Y.3d 380, 392-93 (2006).
10. Cohen v. Bd. of Appeals of the Village of Saddle Rock, 100 N.Y.2d 395, 398 (2003).
11. Albany Area Builders’ Ass’n, 74 N.Y. 2d at 377.
12. Wallach v. Town of Dryden 23 N.Y.3d 728 (2014).
13. DJL Restaurant Corp. v. City of New York, 96 N.Y.2d 91 (2001).
14. Heimbach v. Mills, 67 A.D.2d 731 (1979).
15. Resnick v. Cnty. of Ulster, 44 N.Y.2d 279 (1978); Nydick v. Suffolk Cnty. Legislature, 36
N.Y.2d 951 (1975). Local power over local officers does not apply to district attorneys, who are
treated as state officers even though locally elected. See, e.g., Hoerger v. Spota, 21 N.Y.3d 549
(2013); Carey v. Oswego Cnty. Legislature, 59 N.Y.2d 847 (1983); Kelley v. McGee, 57 N.Y.2d
522 (1978).
16. Resnick, 44 N.Y.2d at 286-87.
17. Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 491 (1929).
18. Empire State Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Smith, 21 N.Y.3d 309,
316-17 (2013) (emphasis in original).
19. See, e.g., Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. City of New York, 97 N.Y.2d 378 (2001);
Uniformed Firefighters Ass’n v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 85 (1980)
20. Empire State Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, 21 N.Y.3d 309.
21. Town of Islip v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 50 (1984).
22. City of New York v. State of N.Y., 94 N.Y.2d 577 (2000).
27

23. Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust for Cultural Resources, 46 N.Y.2d 358 (1978).
24. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of N.Y., 41 N.Y.2d 490 (1977).
25. Empire State Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., 21 N.Y.3d at 318.
26. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. City of New York, 97 N.Y.2d 378 (2001).
27. Greater New York Taxi Ass’n v. State of N.Y., 21 N.Y.3d 289 (2013).
28. Ibid. at 302.
29. Ibid. at 302-03.
30. Empire State Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., 21 N.Y.3d at 319.
31. Farrington v. Pinckney, 1 N.Y.2d 74, 78 (1956).
32. Ibid. at 80-81.
33. Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust for Cultural Resources, 46 N.Y.2d 358, 377 (1978) (Breitel, C.J.,
dissenting). See also Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 483 (1929) (“To exact that laws peculiarly
adapted to conditions existing in the city of New York must apply alike in terms and effect to all
cities, is to deny to the Legislature all powers of reasonable classification based on population in
matters within its field of operation.”); McEneny v. Bd. of Estimate & Apportionment, 232 N.Y.
377, 392-93 (1922) (The act is general in terms. It applies to all cities in the state having a
population of a million or more. It may be conceded that at the present time it is applicable only
to the city of New York, but if so it by no means follows that it was intended only for that city,
since there may and probably will in the near future be one or more cities to which it will be
applicable. Certainly there is no conclusive presumption to the contrary).
34. Farrington, 1 N.Y.2d 74 (upholding special provision for jury selection in counties with
fewer than 100,000 people).

28

35. See, e.g., Stapleton v. Pinckney, 293 N.Y. 330 (1944) (invalidating law that applied only to
counties that contained a city with a population of 125,000 and had a population of not less than
200,000 and not more than 250,000, in effect, applying only to Albany County).
36. N.Y. Const. art. VIII, § 4 (debt limits); N.Y. Const. art. VIII, § 10 (tax limits).
37. There is no tax limit for towns.
38. City of New York v. State of N.Y., 94 N.Y.2d 577 (2000).
39. Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist. v. County of Nassau, 22 N.Y.3d 606, 621 (2014).
40. Ibid.
41. Scharff, “Taxes as Regulatory Tools,” 1575-76.
42. Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist., 22 N.Y.3d at 622.
43. Scharff, “Taxes as Regulatory Tools,” 1585-89.
44. Ibid., 1588. This rule was struck down by the court of appeals in New York Statewide
Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New York City Dep’t of Health & Mental
Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681(2014).
45. Scharff, “Taxes as Regulatory Tools,” 1587.
46. Ibid., 1556-57.
47. Article IX also directs the legislature to provide by law for judicial review, applying an
“over-all public interest standard,” of any governing board decision refusing to consent to an
annexation. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 1(d).
48. State of New York, Department of State, Local Government Handbook, 6th ed. (2009; repr.,
New York State Department of State, 2011), 39-49.
49. Ibid., 42-45.
50. Westchester Cnty. Civil Serv. Emps. Ass’n v. Del Bello, 47 N.Y.2d 886 (1979).
29

51. Nydick v. Suffolk Cnty. Legislature, 36 N.Y.2d 951 (1975).
52. State of New York, Local Government Handbook, 5, 54-55.
53. Cf. Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423 (1989) (finding town had authority to
supersede section 274-a of the Town Law but had failed to properly comply with the formal
requisites for exercising supersession authority).
54. Rozler v. Franger, 46 N.Y.2d 760 (1978), aff’g 61 A.D.2d 46 (4th Dep’t 1978).
55. Ill. Const. art. VII, § 6(i).
56. Professor Hills makes this argument. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., “Hydrofracking and Home
Rule: Defending and Defining an Anti-Preemption Canon of Statutory Construction in New
York,” Albany Law Review 77, no. 2 (2013/2014): 653-58.
57. Cal. Const. art. XIIIB, § 6(a).
58. See Robert M.M. Shaffer, “Unfunded State Mandates and Local Governments,” University of
Cincinnati Law Review 64, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 1065-68.

30

